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Situations such as an entrepreneur overstating a project’s value, or a superior choosing
to under or overstate the gains from a project to a subordinate are common and may
result in acts of deception. In this paper we modify the standard investment game in the
economics literature to study the nature of deception. In this game a trustor (investor)
can send a given amount of money to a trustee (or investee). The amount received is
multiplied by a certain amount, k, and the investee then decides on how to divide the
total amount received. In our modified game the information on the multiplier, k, is known
only to the investee and she can send a non-binding message to the investor regarding
its value. We find that 66% of the investees send false messages with both under and
over, statement being observed. Investors are naive and almost half of them believe the
message received. We find greater lying when the distribution of the multiplier is unknown
by the investors than when they know the distribution. Further, messages make beliefs
about the multiplier more pessimistic when the investors know the distribution of the
multiplier, while the opposite is true when they do not know the distribution.
Keywords: investment game, asymmetric information, deception, understatement, overstatement
Introduction
Lying (or deception) in Economics is a rational act if it leads to an increase in one’s payoffs. Recent
research has shown there may be several motives to lying ranging from pure selfish to altruistic
(Gneezy, 2005). Meanwhile, there is a vast literature on the neuro-biological basis of lying and
manipulative behavior. Zhu et al. (2014) state that substantial correlational evidence suggests that
prefrontal regions are critical to honest and dishonest behavior. For example, Yang et al. (2005)
studied prefrontal gray and white matter volumes for 12 individuals who pathologically lied,
cheated and deceived. They found that liars showed a 22–26% increase in prefrontal white matter
and a 36–42% reduction in prefrontal gray/white ratios relative to their controls. It has been shown
that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects tradeoffs between honesty and self-interest (Zhu et al.,
2014) and that there may also be gender differences in neural basis of deception (Marchewka et al.,
2012).
Lying is a prevalent daily phenomenon and is a part of daily social interaction. Importantly, lying
behavior has important economic consequences. It is also for this reason that the study of lying
is important. While the neuro-biological literature has studied the neurological underpinnings of
deception, experiments in the economics literature have studied how and when individuals lie in
incentivized settings. Starting with Gneezy (2005), the recent literature in experimental economics
has studied specifically the nature of lies for a randomly drawn sample of University students. Using
incentivized experiments this literature has found that lying is prevalent, may not always be selfish,
and may have many motivations.
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This experimental literature has classified the nature of lies
based upon the gains and losses they impose on a third party. For
example, Gneezy (2005) defines four categories of lies. The first
category is composed by lies that help both sides, or at least do not
harm anyone (white lies). The second are lies that may benefit the
other person even though theymay harm the liar. Themotivation
for such lies may be altruism or efficiency motives. Thirdly, a lie
may not help the liar but may harm at least one person (if not
both). These would be classified as spiteful lies. Finally, Gneezy
studies lies that decrease the payoff to the other party and increase
the payoff to the liar; these are classified as black lies. He finds
that people are sensitive to the harm their actions may cause
when deciding to lie. In addition, he finds that this unselfish
motive diminishes with the size of the gain to the decision maker.
Sanchez-Pages and Vorstaz (2007) investigate why a majority of
subjects tell the truth when incentives would suggest otherwise.
They find a group of subjects with preferences for truth-telling
and one that only cares about material incentives. Hurkens and
Kartik (2009) modify the game in Gneezy (2005) and find that
there is lying aversion but that results are also consistent with
the fact that some people never lie and others lie only in their
own benefit. Erat and Gneezy (2013) study white lies (altruistic or
Pareto improving) and find that there is reluctance to tell Pareto
improving lies indicating pure lying aversion.
There are other lies that do not rely on the gains and losses
from the outcomes. In this case the perception that one transmits
may be more important. For example, (Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013) find that people may lie to not appear dishonest
and lies may even be disadvantageous to one-self.1 Utikal and
Fischbacher (2013) study disadvantageous lies where individuals
may lie to maintain a positive self-perception. They argue that if
the utility gained frommaintaining the perception outweighs the
monetary cost then people will tell disadvantageous lies. Sutter
(2009), meanwhile, studies how truth telling can be a strategic
form of lying when the truthful message may not be believed. In
addition, Hao and Houser (2013) show that people may also have
preferences on lies and may prefer incomplete lies over bigger
ones. Finally, Kriss et al. (2013) study deception in an ultimatum
bargaining game under asymmetric information. They find that
deception is greater when informed parties make an explicit
statement than when information is communicated implicitly.
This is especially true for larger stakes. However, allowing the
explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness
reverses this effect. Finally, as in our paper they also observe very
high levels of dishonesty.
Besides the taxonomy of lies mentioned above, there are
many real life situations that involve over, and under, statement
of the truth. Think of a typical situation in a firm where a
superior proposes her subordinate to work on a project. Clearly,
the superior has additional knowledge about it and knows the
potential gains it entails for himself and the subordinate, and
1Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) study what they define as lies in disguise.
In their design subjects face no threat of being caught and no material incentives
to honesty exist in their experiments. They can only observe the distribution of
lying behaviour and find that individuals either lie fully, partially, or are honest.
They explain both full cheating and honesty through the model of lying aversion.
However, this model is not able to explain partial lying.
may choose to over (or under) sell it. Another example is venture
capital where the investee may oversell a project to make it
look attractive2. In these examples the information transmitted
regarding the return on an investment may not be verified
easily and can have adverse economic (efficiency) consequences.3
Situations with asymmetric information are pervasive and may
result in deception due to conflict of interests.
We introduce information asymmetry and communication
in a modification of the standard investment game (Berg et al.,
1995). In this game, two players, an investor and an investee,
are endowed with an initial amount of money. The investor
must decide how much of his initial endowment to invest. The
amount invested is multiplied by a parameter (the multiplier)
greater than one. Then, the investee can decide how much of this
amount, if any, is returned to the investor, keeping the remaining
amount for herself. We introduce information asymmetry in this
setting by informing the investee about the true value of the
multiplier, whereas the investor only has information about the
distribution of the multiplier. We introduce communication by
allowing the investee to send a numerical message to the investor
regarding the value of the multiplier. The investee can decide
whether to inform the investor truthfully, or not. The possibility
of communication between the investee and the investor is what
allows us to study the nature of messages and deception.
We find that under-, and over-, statement of messages is
common with a large proportion of subjects sending false
messages. We find that almost half the investors believe the
message they receive. Further, we find that messages understating
the true value are more likely to be believed.
We also explore why investees may decide to deceive investors
by understating or overstating the true value of the multiplier.
We analyze some possible explanations from the literature that
may explain lying through under, or over, statement. Investees
may want to overstate (the true value of k) if investors are naive,
or believed to be so, and their investment is expected to increase
with the value of k. In this regard, our structure has the flavor
of the cheap-talk scenario in Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) and
Kartik et al. (2006)4 where message inflation will be observed
if those who send the message believe that the receivers of the
message are naive. We find evidence of this behavior as those
investees who overstate the true value of k expect to receive
greater investments than those who tell the truth or understate it.
While overstatement may occur if investors are considered
naive, there are several competing explanations for message
deflation. It may be that investees have beliefs regarding what
types of messages are believable (Sutter, 2009; Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Another possible explanation is guilt
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, 2010). Investees may
understate the true value of k if they expect to return a low
2For example, Bloom Energy an energy startup sold their project as an “industry
creator” that would eventually substitute the domestic grid.
3Evidence suggests that the economic loss to society can be quite large. For
example, Mazar and Ariely (2006) state that the loss from returning used clothes to
the fashion industry is estimated at $16 billion. The cost to the US economy from
the Enron and WorldCom crisis was approximated at $37–42 billion.
4Kartik (2009) introduces the cost of lying in a model of strategic information
transmission.
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amount and therefore feel less guilty. Finally, individuals may
have preferences over the degree and the direction of the lies.
In this scenario individuals may view small (i.e., partial) lies as
more acceptable than big ones (see Hao and Houser, 2013)5,
and understatement could be perceived as more acceptable
than overstatement. We find evidence for all of these possible
explanations.
In our paper the investees can lie to obtain the maximum
benefit for themselves (a black lie), but they can also lie to
maximize the total surplus, by increasing the amount sent by the
investor, and benefit later both parties (a white lie). Therefore,
lies can have positive or negative consequences to both parties
depending on the posterior investee’s decision. In this regard, we
can consider them as gray lies and fit them between white and
black lies in Gneezy’s classification. Further, in our structure lies
are endogenous and may lead to under, and over, statement.
Though the game they study is different, the two papers closest
to ours are Gneezy (2005) and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013). In Gneezy (2005) subjects have 2 options: lie or tell the
truth, in our case they report a numeric message so lying is
endogenous and there can be different degrees of lying. This is
more similar to real-life situations in which the information given
is, for example, the returns on an investment, or the probability
that a project succeeds. As in our paper, lying in Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) is endogenous. Subjects can over or under
state the true values taken by the roll of a dice. In their design
the direction of the lie determines the payoffs. The difference
between Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and this paper
is that in our scenario the consequences of the lies are also
endogenous, given that the investor can react in different ways to
the message and send a larger or smaller fraction to the investee,
who can then decide how much to return.
We contribute to this literature by studying a message that is
open to interpretation by the receivers of the message. The lies
have a strategic element to it as they seek to exploit knowledge
regarding the beliefs. We also analyse the effect of ambiguity on
the distribution of the true state, i.e., the value of the multiplier
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been analyzed
before. Ambiguity is all pervasive in our daily interactions. In
our everyday interactions we frequently encounter situations
where risk is not quantifiable (i.e., ambiguous), while situations
with defined probabilistic outcomes are few. For example, future
stock prices are ambiguous6, as is the quality of education, or
the outcome of a business venture (as we state in the venture
capital example earlier). We find that introducing ambiguity may
exacerbate the effect of information asymmetry as we observe
higher levels of deception.
Methods
Anonymity was always preserved (in agreement with Spanish
Law 15/1999 on Personal Data Protection). No association was
ever made between participants’ names and the results. As is
standard in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are
5Note that this explanation is similar to an understatement being more believable.
6There is a substantial literature on ambiguity in the Finance literature.
involved other than preserving the anonymity of participants.
This procedure was checked and approved by the Deans at
the University Carlos III of Madrid; the institution hosting the
experiments. At that time no official IRB was established at the
university.
Participants and General Protocol
A total of 694 undergraduate students from the university
were recruited for an hour and the average payoff was
approximately e20. Including the instructions, the experiment
lasted approximately 45min. Prior to their recruitment, all
subjects were given a questionnaire (see supplementary SI1).
Responding to the questionnaire was a pre-requisite to
participating in the experiments. The questionnaire contained
personal information about age, studies, grades, family origin etc.
All instructions were computer based (see supplementary
SI2). This protocol was implemented to ensure strict anonymity
across subjects and to minimize the interaction with the
experimenter. After making their decisions subjects responded to
a set of questions (see supplementary SI3). The experiment ended
after all subjects had responded to this second set of questions.
They were then called out individually and paid their earnings
privately.
The Investment Game
Subjects played the investment game introduced by Berg et al.
(1995). In this game, two individuals, investee and investor,
receive an initial endowment of 100 dex (experimental money;
approx. $12). The investor can send any amount (M) between 0
and 100 dex to the investee. The amount sent by the investor is
then multiplied by k (the multiplier). Finally, the investee decides
how much of the amount received (k × M) is returned to the
investor, keeping the remaining amount for herself.
Individuals were randomly selected into sessions and roles
were randomly assigned. Investees and investors were assigned
to separate rooms in the same building before they arrived for
the experiment and were referred to as player A and player B,
respectively. Both were told they would be paired with another
person (A/B) in a different location.
Treatments
We compare variations of the standard investment game (Berg
et al., 1995) where we introduce uncertainty (for the investor)
regarding the value of k. We introduce information asymmetry
by giving the information on the value k takes only to the investee.
From the beginning, the investee gets to know the actual value
of k, and knows that the investor does not know this value.
All this is common knowledge for both players. Further, in
these treatments we also allow for communication between the
subjects. The investee can decide whether to send a numerical
message informing the investor about the value of k.7 The
investee is free to state any value of k and may choose to deceive
the investor or not.
Below we describe the main treatments in detail and then
provide justification for the treatment selection. The treatments
are also summarized in Table 1.
7In Sanchez-Pages andVorsatz (2009), senders can choose whether to tell the truth,
lie, or remain silent.
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TABLE 1 | Treatments.
Timing of the messages
No messages Message before investor’s decision Message after investor’s decision
Information known by the investor about k k ∈ {2, 3, 4} 234_No 234_ExAnte 234_ExPost
k > 1 k>1_No k>1_ExAnte
Treatment 234_No k (= 2, 3 or 4)
The investor is told that k can now take any value between
{2, 3, 4} with equal probability.
Treatment 234_ExAnte
Ex-ante message about k (= 2, 3, or 4) The only difference from
treatment 234_No is that now the investee can decide whether
to send a message or not regarding the value of k prior to
the decision of the investor. The message is numerical and the
investee can input any value. Upon receiving the message the
investor decides how much to send to the investee. In case of no
message the investor is informed that there is no message.
In order to further analyse the reasons why individuals over,
or under, state the value of k we conducted another treatment in
which the investees send a message ex-post:
Treatment 234_ExPost
Ex-post message about k (= 2, 3, or 4) The only difference from
treatment 234_ExAnte is that the investee informs (or not) the
investor of the value of the k after the investor has decided how
much to send.
Finally, we study how the degree of information asymmetry
affects false messages. In order to do this, we conducted two
additional treatments where the investor was not informed about
the distribution of k.
Treatment k>1_No
Ambiguity treatment The only difference from the 234_No
treatment is that the investor is told that k can now take any value
greater than one. From the beginning, the investee gets to know
that the value of k is equal to 3, and is told about the information
the investor has. All this is common information.
Treatment k>1_ExAnte
Ex-ante message about k (> 1) The only difference between
treatment k>1_No and this treatment is that now the investee
can send a (numerical) message indicating the value of k prior to
the investor’s decision.
The nature of pre-play communication we have is minimal.
Given the value of the return on the investment (k), the investee
can send any numeric announcement to the investor regarding
the value k takes8. While compromising on the richness of
language,9 using only numeric values has an advantage as it
enables us to clearly measure the direction and the size of the false
message, i.e., above or below the actual value. This also enables
8Note that we didn’t want to impose any constraint in themessage sent by investees
in treatment k>1_ExAnte. In order to keep treatments comparable, we didn’t
impose any constraints in treatments 234_ExAnte and 234_ExPost either.
9See Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010).
us to measure clearly when subjects over-, and under-, state in
their messages. We further avoid the difficulties associated with
the subjective classification of language. The use of language may
be an important factor in reciprocity if agents have preferences
on “language.” That is, agents may interpret language differently
and respond accordingly to it. Note, however, that the study of
reciprocity is not the focus of this paper.
Results
In this section we first study the nature of false messages,
i.e., how subjects inflate, or deflate, messages. We then study
whether investors believe the messages they receive. Finally, we
analyze subjects’ behavior in the game and their responses to the
questionnaire.
False Messages
In principle any message sent should be interpreted as cheap talk.
However, if investees believe that investors are naive, i.e., believe
the messages they receive, they may be interested in sending
a message to influence their investment decision. In this case,
if investees believe that the amount sent by the investors may
increase with the return on the investment, k, they may then
overstate their messages in order to receive a higher amount
from the investor (Ottaviani and Squintani, 2006). Contrarily, the
investees may decide to understate the value of k if they anticipate
that they will return a very small amount to the investor. In other
words, understating k and subsequently returning less can be
explained by guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006),
where decision makers feel guilty if they disappoint others. If this
is the case then messages can influence what the investor will
expect to receive, and to avoid disappointment, investees might
report a lower value of k if they expect that they will return little.10
Note that investees could believe that lower values of k are more
believable, and they could then decide to understate k.
We will now look at results from the treatment (234_ExAnte)
where k can take any value from the distribution {2, 3, 4} with
equal probability. Investees can choose to send a message, or
none, regarding the value of k. We have data from 134 students,
organized in 67 pairs. First we identify those who sent false
messages and those who told the truth (see Figure 1). Of all
investees in this treatment, 14.93% decided not to send any
message while, 11.94% sent a message outside of the known
distribution. We consider these two groups as sending an
uninformative message. Investees may choose not to send a
message due to two reasons. One may be that they think that
10Note that this assumes that a player’s utility depends on others’ beliefs.
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of messages by return. Treatment is 234_ExAnte.
any message they send may be considered as “cheap talk.” On
the other hand a message may not be sent to not transmit any
information to the investor.11
Excluding the subjects who sent an uninformative message,
almost the same proportion of individuals sent false messages,
51.02%, and told the truth about the value of k, 48.98%.
Meanwhile, 28.57% understated k, while 22.45% overstated it.
We classify false messages according to the difference between
the real and the reported values of k for each value of k (Figure 1).
The proportion of individuals who told the truth is higher for
low values of k: 46% (32%) [25%] when k took value of 2 (3)
[4]. However, pairwise tests of proportions (Table 2) indicate
that the differences in proportions are not statistically significant.
The proportion of individuals acting strategically and overstating
the true value of k is the same when k took the value of 2 or
3. Understatement of k is significantly higher for k = 4 than
when k= 3.
We may get understatement due to two reasons. First, and
consistent with the guilt aversion hypothesis, investees may
believe that the larger the reported value of k the more investors
are going to be likely to believe that they will be returned a large
amount. As a result, if they plan on returning a small amount,
they will be more likely to understate the value of k when k is
high. The second reason could be strategic. If investors are not
naive and have prior beliefs on subject responses, investees may
strategically best respond. In this case investees may strategically
understate to make their messages believable, and to induce
investors to send a larger amount. In the following section we will
see that investors find smaller values more believable than large
ones.
We now study whether our results are robust to the
introduction of ambiguity regarding the value that k can
take. Most situations in real life involve a certain degree of
ambiguity, for example, situations with defined probabilistic
outcomes are very few. We want to analyse whether lying
behavior is similar under ambiguity. Similarly, Rode (2010)
varies the level of information asymmetry to study the effect
11Alternatively, those who send a message outside the distribution may have done
it because they thought that any message sent may not be believable, or because
they did not understand the game properly.
TABLE 2 | False messages.
Tests of proportions (p-value)
k = 2 vs. k = 3 k = 2 vs. k = 4 k = 3 vs. k = 4
Told the truth about k
(k = message)
0.3086 0.1305 0.6481
Overstated the value
of k (k < message)
0.6976 – –
Understated the
value of k (k >
message)
– – 0.0402
Treatment is 234_ExAnte.
on lying and trust. He finds that advisors tell the truth more
frequently when decision makers’ uncertainty is low, as advisors
feel less morally bound to send accurate information. Decision
makers followed the recommendations independently of the
level of uncertainty. However, Rode (2010) finds that inducing a
competitive environment, previous to the communication game,
reduced the proportion of recommendations that are followed
by the decision makers when the level of uncertainty is low or
medium.
We compare the results of the uncertainty treatment
(234_ExAnte) with those of the ambiguity treatment (k >
1_ExAnte). Contrary to Rode (2010), we find that the proportion
of subjects who tell the truth in the ambiguity treatment is
significantly smaller while, the proportion of the subjects who
overstate the value of k is higher (see Table 3 and Figure 2). This
can be partially due to the fact that k is always equal to 3 in the
ambiguity treatment. When comparing the subset of subjects in
treatment 234_ExAnte for which k = 3 to those in the ambiguity
treatment (k = 3), the proportion of subjects who tell the truth
is much smaller in the latter, but the proportion of subjects
overstating returns are not significantly different. This shows that
the introduction of ambiguity encourages false messages.
Are Messages Believable?
We obtain information on subject beliefs from the questionnaires
we conducted after the players made their decisions. This allows
us to see whether messages are believed. This information is
useful as it also tells us whether investors are naive.
In the questionnaire we asked investors about the value they
thought k took.12 Considering only those pairs in which the
investee sent an informative message, a sizeable proportion of
investors (45.16%) believed the message, while 48.39% of the
investors believed that the investees were overstating the value
of k. In contrast, only 6.45% believed that investees understated
the value of k.13 This means that most investors expected the
investees to act strategically and to overstate k.
Overstating k did indeed induce subjects to send a larger
amount. We check whether those investors who believed that
k took larger values sent a larger amount. In order to do this,
we compare investors with different beliefs. In the treatment
12Unfortunately, and due to software problems, we could only collect 50% of the
answers to this question in the questionnaire.
13Three individuals reported a message outside of the distribution.
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TABLE 3 | False messages in the ambiguity treatment.
Tests of proportions (p-value)
234_ExAnte vs. k > 1_ExAnte 234_ExAnte vs. k > 1_ExAnte (k = 3 in both cases)
Told the truth (k = message) 0.0041 0.0872
Overstated the value of k (k < message) 0.0018 0.2556
Understated the value of k (k > message) 0.6032 0.4150
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of messages by return and treatment.
234_ExAnte, those investors who believed (as reported in the
questionnaire) that k = 2 sent on average (median) 33.5 (25.0),
while those who believed k = 3 sent 59.0 (55.0). This difference
is significant (Mann–Whitney p = 0.0055, t-test p = 0.0145,
and the median test p = 0.016). If we consider all treatments
with k = {2,3,4} (234_No, 234_ExAnte, 234_ExPost), investors
who believed k = 2 sent on average (median) 36.0 (30.0),
while those who believed k = 3 sent 53.6 (60.0), with Mann–
Whitney p = 0.0023, t-test p = 0.0028 and Median test p <
0.001. We do not have enough data to do the same analysis for
those who believed k = 4 (only 9 observations for the three
treatments)14 .
Interestingly investors were more likely to believe the message
when the reported value of k was low, i.e., 89% (36%) [25%]
of the investors believed a message stating that k was equal
to 2 (3) [4]. This suggests that if investors are not naive then
investees may also have incentives to understate k. That is, there
is also a strategic motive to understate k to make messages more
credible.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of beliefs by treatment.15
When no message was sent (234_No), investors were more
likely to believe that k would take low values, only 11% thought
that it took the value of 4, while 50% thought it was 3 (the
expected value). In those treatments where a message was
14In Figure S1 we plot our measure of trust (the investment), by the message
received. We do this separately for the treatments 234_ExAnte and K>1_ExAnte.
When the message receiver knows the distribution of k, pairwise tests show that
investment is the same for the three types of messages. When the message receiver
does not know the distribution, pairwise test show that investment when k is larger
than 4 is greater than investment when it is exactly 4, however, it is not different
from investment when k is 3. The other pairwise comparisons are not significantly
different from zero.
15Restricting the sample to subjects who received informative messages and
believed that k would take the values 2, 3, or 4.
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of beliefs by treatment. Note: Proportion of
subjects by treatment who believed that the value of k was 2, 3, or 4.
sent (234_ExAnte and 234_ExPost), beliefs were even more
pessimistic, as a larger fraction of individuals thought that k
took the values 2 or 3. The effect of the message was then
to induce investors to believe that returns were lower. In fact,
in the treatment “234_ExAnte,” 63, 29, and 9% of investors
thought that the value of k was 2, 3, and 4, respectively. This
distribution is significantly different from the one corresponding
to the treatment 234_No (Kruskal–Wallis test p = 0.0547). In
the treatment “234_ExPost,” 53, 44, and 3% of investors believed
that the value of k was 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In this case the
difference with 234_No is not significant (Kruskal–Wallis test
p = 0.1394), but the number of observations is lower.
The questionnaire responses suggest that investors expected
false messages; in fact, they expected that the value of k would be
overstated and upon receiving low values, found them believable.
It is clear that the messages were not cheap talk for a sizeable
proportion of subjects. This is important as it raises the possibility
of strategic behavior both on the part of investees and investors.
In addition, the introduction of messages made the investors
more pessimistic about the value of k.
We now analyse whether messages are considered cheap talk
by subjects in the treatment k>1_ExAnte. Results in this case
are very similar to those found above. When we analyse whether
investors actually believed the messages, we find that under
ambiguity the proportion of investors who believe the message
is still sizable (38%). Interestingly, 15% of the investors thought
that the investees were under-reporting the value of k. This is
larger than the proportion that believed that the message was
understated by the investees in the 234_ExAnte treatment, 6.45%.
As shown in Figure 4, in treatment k > 1_No, 51% of
individuals thought that the value of k was 2, meanwhile 29, 3, 9,
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FIGURE 4 | Distribution of beliefs by treatment. Ambiguity treatments.
and 9% thought that it was 3, 4, 5, and>5, respectively. The effect
of the message seems to be very different in this case as it moves
the distribution of beliefs to the right. When a message was sent
only 29% of the subjects thought that the value of k was 2, while
38, 6, 15, and 12% thought that it was 3, 4, 5, and>5, respectively.
According to a Kruskal–Wallis test, the difference is significant
at the 10% level (p = 0.0903). This also shows that individuals
have pessimistic beliefs under ambiguity, and contrary to what
we found before, the message reverses this pessimism16 .
Comparing those who believed the message with those who
did not believe it, those who believed had an average payoff of
82.43 DEX, while this was 80.63 DEX for those who did not
believe the message. These two numbers are not statistically
different, whether we use a two-sample t-test (p = 0.8154) or
the Wilkinson–Mann–Whitney test (p = 0.8759). An equality
of medians test also reaches the same conclusion (p = 0.89).
In contrast, those who lied obtained higher returns in the
experiment; they received on average 106.52 DEX, while those
who told the truth received 75.125 DEX. The absolute difference
is now larger, and a one-sided t-test would give a p-value of
0.0599, even if the other tests do not report a difference that is
statistically significant (p > 0.1).
Why are False Messages Sent?
In this section we explore the motives behind under, and over,
statement of messages. Earlier (Figure 1) we saw that 20.8% of
the investees understated the value of k, while 16.42% overstated
it. Those who overstated k could have done it for strategic
reasons, while those who understated it could have done it due
to both guilt aversion and strategic reasons if they believed that
exaggeration is not credible. In what follows we will investigate
this further.
Strategic Reasons
In the survey we asked the investees how much they expected
to receive from the investors (given the message they had sent).
We can use this question to understand whether investees who
overstated the value of k did it to get the investor to send them
a larger amount. The amount they expected to receive should be
larger for those who overstated k than for those who told the truth
and those who understated it.
16In Figures S2 and S3 we plot the distribution of beliefs by message received for
both treatments in which a message is sent ex ante.
FIGURE 5 | Amount investees expected to receive from investors in
treatment 234_ExAnte.
Results using the treatment 234_ExAnte are shown in
Figure 5. We find that subjects who overstated returns expected
to receive on average 49.55 (median = 50), while the amount
was 38.94 (median = 37.5) for subjects who told the truth or,
understated the returns. AWilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test shows
that these two numbers are statistically different (p = 0.0997), in
addition, a non-parametric test for differences inmedians reaches
the same conclusion (p = 0.033).17
Understatement can be due to strategic reasons as well. As
we have seen above, messages with lower values of k were more
believable, which is consistent with understating the value of k
for strategic reasons, that is, to make the message more believable
and induce the investor to send a larger amount. Also, we
found a large percentage of investees that understated its value
when k was 4.
Guilt Aversion
Another reason for understating the value of k is to avoid
anticipated guilt aversion. Some investees may feel guilty if they
return a small amount knowing that the investor gets to know
that k is large. If investees plan to return a small amount, then
they may report a smaller k to avoid investor disappointment. If
the investors could know the exact value of k, the message would
stop being useful. To avoid investor disappointment, investees
would then be more likely to return a larger amount than the
amount they actually sent.
In the questionnaire we asked investees how much they would
have returned if the investor had known the exact value of k.
Figure 6 shows that out of those who understated k, 54% replied
that they would have returned a larger amount if the investor
had known the exact value of k. In contrast, out of those who
did not understate the returns, just 28% replied that they would
have returned more to the investor if the investor had known
the exact value of k. The first proportion is significantly larger
than the second one (p = 0.0512 in a one tail difference in
proportions test).18
In the treatment 234_ExPost investees sent the message about
the value of k ex post. The advantage of running the ex-post
message treatment is that it removes the strategic motive to
17A standard t-test would give a larger p-value, but the number of observations is
too low to derive reliable conclusions.
18The two tails difference in proportions test gives p = 0.1025, however, the
hypothesis we test in this case is whether the proportion who would return more
is larger within those who understated k than within those who did not understate
the value of k.
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FIGURE 6 | Guilt aversion. Proportion of investees that would have returned
more if k was known. Treatment 234_ExAnte.
FIGURE 7 | Proportion of subjects who overstated the value of k,
understated it or told the truth. Treatment 234_ExPost.
send a false message as ex-post messages have no impact on the
amount sent.
One can see from Figure 7 that 42% told the truth about
the value of k, while the rest either overstated or understated
its value. Out of those who overstated k, the majority (83%)
expected to receive more from the investor than what they
received. In contrast, the percentage is only 56% among those
who did not overstate returns. We can think of these messages
as inflicting some kind of non-monetary “punishment” on the
investors. That is, the investee expected to receive more from
the investor and when sending the message about the value of
k reported a larger number than the true value. However, when
comparing those who understated the value of the returns to the
rest, approximately half the subjects of each group reported that
they would have returned more if the investor had known the
exact value of the returns.
Questionnaire Responses and False Messages
We asked our subjects to respond to a questionnaire after
the experiment and before the subjects knew their earnings.
Through the questionnaire we can relate social and/or behavioral
characteristics to subject choices in the experiment. Information
was obtained on subject characteristics such as how frequently
they lie to their parents, friends, acquaintances, and partners.
Other questions asked them whether they lie to avoid harming
other people or in their own benefit. They could answer
using a Likert scale from 1 (very frequently) to 5 (never).
We create dummy variables equal to one if the individual
admits lying very frequently, frequently or sometimes, and zero
otherwise. Below we elaborate on whether there is a significant
relationship between these variables and subject behavior by
running multinomial logit models in which we estimate the
correlation between the answers to these survey questions and
behavior in the experiment. Obviously, these variables are self-
reported, but at least we can analyse whether those who sent
false messages in the experiment about the value of k also
admit lying in real life. Our dependent variable has 4 categories:
uninformative message, lie understating, tell the truth, and lie
overstating.
We first run a specification in which we analyse whether
lying in the experiment is correlated to the subjects answering
that they lie to their parents, friends, partner or acquaintances
(results are reported in columns 1–4 of Table 4). Results in
Panel A (without controls) and Panel B (with controls) show
that those individuals who admit lying to their friends or
partners are not more likely to send false messages in the
experiment. Those who admit lying to their parents are more
likely to send uninformative messages or to lie understating
the value of k, however, these results become non-significant
in the specifications in which we add control variables. Those
who admit lying to acquaintances are more likely to tell the
truth in the experiment, both in the specifications with and
without controls. Control variables include a gender dummy,
year of birth, a dummy for whether they are currently working,
whether they are in a technical degree or in Sociology, Law,
or Journalism (the reference category are Economics related
degrees), and their average grade. We then analyse whether
lying in the experiment is correlated to lying to avoid harming
others or in their own benefit. Results are shown in columns
5–8 of both panels, with and without controls, respectively.
Those subjects who claimed lying in their own benefit are
more likely to tell the truth in the experiment, however the
coefficient becomes non-significant when we add the controls.
As before, individuals in the ambiguity treatment are both less
likely to tell the truth and more likely to lie overstating the
value of k.
Discussion
Our experiments show that lying is prevalent and involves a
complex cognitive process. Individuals may have beliefs about
which form of lying may be credible (i.e., understatement) or
may elicit a certain response (i.e., overstatement). We further
find that understatement is more believable than overstatement.
Further, more than half the individuals believe the messages
they receive, though, a priori they have no reason to believe
them. The different types of lying we observe can be observed
by guilt aversion and strategic lying. We observe a combination
of both indicating that individuals have preferences over lying
that are conditioned by their beliefs. We further find that
beliefs of investors are conditioned by the degree of asymmetric
information.
As found by others earlier (Gneezy, 2005; Kriss et al., 2013)
we find a few truthful people in our experiments. Restricting
the sample to those who sent an informative message 66% of
the subjects sent false messages. The value of the multiplier (k)
did not affect the probability of lying, but understatement of
the multiplier was more likely when the multiplier was 4 than
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TABLE 4 | False messages and questionnaire responses.
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Uninformative Lie Tell Lie Uninformative Lie Tell Lie
message understating the truth overstating message understating the truth overstating
PANEL A: WITHOUT CONTROLS
Lies to parents −0.135* 0.194** −0.0212 −0.0386
(0.0742) (0.0952) (0.0825) (0.0932)
Lies to friends 0.103 0.0108 −0.109 −0.0054
(0.142) (0.132) (0.103) (0.135)
Lies to partner 0.0645 0.229 −0.135 −0.158
(0.165) (0.205) (0.124) (0.142)
Lies to acquaintances −0.0678 −0.0481 0.175* −0.059
(0.0814) (0.0869) (0.093) (0.0914)
Lies to avoid harming others −0.0351 0.0109 −0.0385 0.0628
(0.0811) (0.0796) (0.0869) (0.0845)
Lies in own benefit −0.122 −0.0547 0.211* −0.0341
(0.0861) (0.0918) (0.116) (0.0993)
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
Lies to parents −0.113 0.137 0.0101 −0.0341
(0.0831) (0.107) (0.092) (0.104)
Lies to friends 0.0795 0.108 −0.127 −0.0611
(0.143) (0.167) (0.0974) (0.124)
Lies to partner 0.0148 0.329 −0.153 −0.19
(0.162) (0.232) (0.110) (0.131)
Lies to acquaintances −0.0637 −0.0712 0.175* −0.0401
(0.0912) (0.0936) (0.106) (0.101)
Lies to avoid harming others −0.0268 0.0353 −0.104 0.0957
(0.0848) (0.0857) (0.089) (0.0919)
Lies in own benefit −0.125 0.000692 0.193 −0.0696
(0.0855) (0.124) (0.142) (0.0996)
Treatment: k>1_ExAnte −0.0599 0.0233 −0.192** 0.229*** −0.0523 0.0299 −0.209** 0.232***
(0.081) (0.0883) (0.0828) (0.0846) (0.0791) (0.0859) (0.0844) (0.0842)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. All regressions have 121 observations. The results reported are marginal effects. The dependent variable has
4 categories: uninformative message, lie understating, tell the truth, and lie overstating. Results are for treatmnets “234_AM” and “Kunknown_AM.” Control variables are described in
the text.
when it was 3. Interestingly, the incidence of false messages is
much larger in the ambiguity treatment than in the uncertainty
treatment.
We elicit beliefs regarding the message investors received.
This allows us to see whether subjects are naive. Almost half
the investors believe the message they receive. Further, messages
stating a lower value of k are more believable while messages
stating a higher value of k are less likely to be believed. We
find that subjects have more pessimistic beliefs regarding k
under ambiguity, and while the message makes beliefs about the
multiplier more pessimistic when investors know the distribution
of k, the opposite is true in the ambiguity treatment.
Subjects both over, and under, -state the returns on the
investment. We find this to be consistent both with strategic
lying (Ottaviani and Squintani, 2006) and with guilt aversion
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Understatement can also be
explained by the fact that investees may know that lower values
of the returns are more believable.
Finally, results from the questionnaire conducted at the end
of the experiment show that those who tell the truth in the
experiment are also more likely to report lying to acquaintances
in real life. We did not include questions that we could use in
order to measure different personality traits in the questionnaire.
These personality traits could also affect the propensity to deceive
or to be prone to deception.
Our results have some consequences for the design of
organizations. They suggest that a less information opens the
door for deceptive acts. More research is needed, however, on
what are the institutional arrangements that minimize deception
and encourage trust facilitating exchanges.
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